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For kno\vledge based systenlS \Nhich is usually as n?.;.tural language de-
scriptions, has to be transferred into formal representations. The authors argue that the 
expressive power of natur2j language lies partiaily in the possibility that it can be consid-
ered as a rich system of subianguages. The category of theory morphisms is an adequate 
mathematical tool to handle the sublanguages of different Eubfields, different points of 
references and different levels of abstraction. To prove the claim jokes are analysed and it 
is shown that in this way a very abstract logical characterisation can be given. The f-laper 
tries to answer even the question in the title. 
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1" Introduction 
morphism. 
'Even a joke should 
have some meamng ... · 
Nowadays more and more so called knowledge based systems are manu-
factured. One may be surprised to learn that one of the most important 
bottlenecks is to describe the knowledge of a domain with precision enough. 
Even if the subconscious abilities of the experts are neglected, and good 
textbooks are considered to be available, it is a difficult task to translate 
the natural language descriptions into formal ones. Even if the domain has 
even mediocre complexity, then the adequate formal representation may 
need different sublanguages for different subdomains. Moreover, the for-
mal description fixes the level of discussion while natural languages allow 
us to change the level of discussion without stating so. So at a formal, 
logical formalization we cannot do better but consider natural language as 
a conglomerate of sublanguages. 
Let us see the most formalized field of human thinking: mathemat-
ics. Mathematical reasoning is governed by the rules of classical logic that 
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IS predicate calculus. However, mathematical texts are never written in 
the strict, formal language of logic, but in a special fragment of natural 
language, namely in the so called mathematical language. More precisely 
mathematicians use a very complex hierarchy of languages. At the bot-
tom there lays essentially the language of first order classical logic, since 
all sub-languages can be interpreted in it. Above it there are the lan-
guages of different fields of mathematics as well as the different dialects of 
the presentations of definitions, theorems and proofs. Language of formal 
mathematics can be strictly formalised on a higher level than predicate cal-
culus, see GERGELY, VERSHININ (1981). If creative mathematical thinking 
is considered, then regions of non-formal, non-mathematical thinking also 
get an important role. Mathematical intuition is generally based on expe-
riences coming from fields different the one of problem in question. The 
above said are true not only for mathematics, but in all fields of human 
intellect. J\!atural language can be considered as a rich system of closely 
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different fran1eS of reference may throVl light on a neVl solution (c.f. 
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stored as the above 111echanisIll calls for a structured 
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For the above reason the study of 11ieTarchies \vas started in 
(1980 and 1981). so we found that 
usage of this notion may help to understand the mechanism of humour. 
This is also KOESTLER (1977). He claims that the mechanism 
of humour and creativity in science (problem solving) is basically the same. 
So to test whether a theory of language hierarchies is powerful enough to 
be the theoretical basis of creative problem solving systems, in this paper 
we use it to explain the semantics of humour. vVe don't want to deal with 
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the social and psychological aspects of understanding humour, not denying 
that they have decisive importance. Our aim is a logical analysis that is 
we want to show that a text which considered funny can be characterized 
at a very abstract level. 
2. What is 
To show the possibility of formal discussion, first we provide the defini-
tions of the basic notions. can be studied at different levels (cf. 
SZOTS (1982)). If it IS not mentioned othenvise, definitions are 
at abstract level. 
the atlst-ra.ct ia:ng;lli:\ge IS considered as its 
and semantics: >. 
meamn!,;l:ttl eXflr{:S.'31C)ll:S, it may be 
is considered as the set of 
basic expI'eE:Slons and 
those gr·arlll11cltJ.Cctl rules that gene:ra.te the others. At abstract level the use 
0f model theoretic semantics is acle<luate that IS, semantics is the pair of 
class of models and m:eaDll:lg function: =< is the class 
of pC}SEnt1le -yvorlds In vvhich the and IS 
a function giving the meaning of an e}(pression 111 
Q, model.So considered also as a 
of classical logic 
< "-/' . 
In the case 
structures j a.nd 
IS the class of relation 
renders truth-value to the formulas. Function con-
llects though we also have syntactical tools to handle 
semantical questions, the so called calculi. These consist of synt.actical t.ext-
rules sen1antical e.g. c certain truth-value. 
The pair of a language and calculi is called logic. 
GERGELY, SZABOLCSI (1979) show that model theoret.ic semantics 
is relevant also from the linguistic of vie'\v. I-Iowever, the usage of 
language, as the mechanism of understanding, cannot be properly handled 
at. abstract level only. When speaking about. representation of semant.ics 
we stipulate t.hat a system using a language has some inner model of the 
environment.. The representation of semantics consists of 
the set. of the possible inner models, 
a connection between the syntax and these inner models, which SlI11-
ulate the interpretation funct.ion of semant.ics (cf. GERGEL Y. SZ()TS 
(1982)). 
N at.ural language is highly complex, so it. can be best. handled as a 
complex system of sublanguages. Here we do not t.hink of a predetermined 
division of the original language, but of the system of ail possible su b1an-
guages. Such a system is called a language hierarchy. MONTAGUF (1975) 
showed that an arbitrary wide fragment of a natural language can be in-
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terpreted in a logical language similar to the classical one. So we may 
stipulate the existence of such interpretations, and instead of fragments of 
a natural language mathematically well defined languages can be consid-
ered, which it is interpreted in. So instead of the language hierarchy of a 
natural language a hierarchy of languages of a mathematical logic can be 
considered. 
Language hierarchies are mathematically investigated in ANDREKA, 
GERGELY, NE?viETI (1980) and (1981). The connection between the lan-
guages is given by the interpretations. Let L1 and L2 be two languages. An 
interpretation from L1 to L2 is such a function from FI to F2, which creates 
also a mapping between the meanings, and these two functions commute 
with meaning functions hI, k2. That is f: Fl ~ F2 is an interpretation, 
if there is f' such that 
Clearly the sublanguages with the interpretations form a category. 
There may be or may not be interpretation between two languages. 
However, the investigations referred to above show that always can be 
found a connection between any pair of languages even if they are not 
connected. Namely there exist two languages with the following properties, 
respectively: 
i) a more general language which can be interpreted in both languages; 
ii) a less general language which both languages can be interpreted in, 
this one is said to be the common language of the original ones. 
For those who speak the language of category theory it means that 
the category of the language hierarchy is complete and cocomplete. 
U sing several languages mixed together first were suggested by 
GOGl)EI' (1977) for prograJll hierar-
is the mathematical version of their idea. Other formal tools can 
also be used for the same purpose, like situational structures in GERGELY. 
VERSHININ (1993). Language hierarchy seems to be the most general form, 
that is why we use it in the present paper. 
3. The Basic Idea 
KOESTLER (1977) states that the source of humour is 'the perceiving of a 
situation or idea in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames 
of reference'. RASKIN (1979) claims basically the same, and several of 
the classical theories can be fitted into this thesis. 'Ne formalize this idea 
according to our purposes: 
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(i) two different sublanguages meet in a text in an unusual and often 
irregular way, however 
(ii) there is a link between them. 
Note that this can be generalized to non-verbal humour, if we speak 
about 'language' of pictures, or 'language' of gestures or about any similar 
'languages' . 
From the above feature two directions of this study open up: 
(i) the examination of what sublanguages are confronted 
(ii) the examination of the links, connecting them. 
As for (i) one can think about such sublanguages as 
the languages of different sciences, 
the of different 
official larQ2;u.age. 
nursery la,nguage, 
military language, and so OIL 
Any further study of this question is beyond of our line of investi-
gation, it is rather subject to psychology or sociology. can but only 
indicate the contrasted languages in square brackets, if they can be la-
belled easily. Our purpose is to study the links between the confronted 
languages. 
4, Basic rvfechanism: Double LVlea.nlng 
(1) The Junior String Quartet Brahms last night. Brahms lost. 
[music - sport] 
The first sentence is one of the language of music, the second is con-
structed as one of the language of sport. The link is provided by the word 
played which can be interpreted both in the universe of music and the 
one of sport. When the whole text is interpreted, the second sentence has 
to be meant metaphorically: the performance was a loss for the case of 
music as well as for Brahms. Were this plainly stated the text would not 
be humorous at all. Clearly the humour in this message is in the way it is 
delivered that is in the sudden change of language. 
The above shown mechanism can be discussed formally at abstract 
level as follows. 
Let L1 =< Fi , M;, k; > and Lj =< Fj, Mj, kj > be two sublanguages, 
and the same syntactical unit (word or phrase) s be element of both F; 
and Fj . However, let the value of k;(s) and kj(s) be different and/or the 
two classes of models be also different. Let a, {3 be texts of Li and Lj, 
respectively, and let us consider the texts o:s{3 (see Fig. 1). 
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meaning of s in A 
A is a model of L] 
B is a model of 
Fig. 1. 
If text o!.S f3 is interpreted until the point marked by , the meaning 
may be definite and unambiguous, but perceiving f3 a second meaning 
"' ... H","", connected to the same text s. The whole text O!.sf3 mayor may not 
have the meaning in both models but has to have some in one of them. 
This mechanism vlill be referred to as double meaning. 
1'l''l"t·ura1.1v the scheme O!.s/3 is only a rough one. (1) the word """"""TO.'" 
the role of s. It is embedded in O!. (the first , and interpret-
f3 '\lve remember it. Later on vve see more sophisticated mixing of the 
elements of this scheme. 
Note the unit s is the link between the two languages. 
In certain situations such a link alone is sufficient e 1loke 
but it can be called humour. Usually there is also some 
connection between the two different meanings. In the case of (1) we can 
::>T)nT'Pf"l::>t.P the joke, if we can refer the verb lost to the composer 
whose opus was played. 
In what follows 'Ne discuss some with p'1'"('1'I,, the same scheme. 
(2) An editor spent a whole afternoon cementing holes in the sidewalks 
m front of his house, only to have a kid come along on a bike and make 
ruts through the fresh concrete. The editor let go some sulphurous words. 
Hearing his language, the kid's mother protested. 
'I thought you loved children' she said. 'I do' replied the editor. 'But 
in the abstract - not in the concrete'. 
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Here the phrase 'in the abstract - not in the concrete' belongs to 
a highly abstracted language, but because of the context of the first oc-
currence, the word 'concrete' may mean a really concrete material. The 
two meanings of the word concrete are independent from each other, the 
semantic link is created by the situation. 
Generally the two meanings have a natural connection, like in the 
following joke. 
( 3) This girl me army does not believe in her 
innocence. 
[politics - sex} 




Note the clever timing: the connection is stated in and ex-
plained later, that is, the scheme takes the form a{3s. 
'Non-fiction' stories also support our thesis about the role of differ-
ent sublanguages in humour. The following one took place in 1944 while 
liberating Paris: 
(4) The battle's principal victim was one or Gabriel's massive Corin-
thian the fifth rrom the left along the facade or the Hotel Crillon. 
According to the legend, it was shot apart by the gunner or the tank de-
stroyer 'Filibuster' after he had been warned by his commands to 'watch 
out for the 'fifth column'. The commander vIas referring to the collabo-
rationist snipers. 
[military - architecture] 
5. The Role of Background Knowledge 
(5) Ug, the caveman, observed his mate running to him m tears, her 
leopard-skin skirt in disorder. 'U g', she cried, distraught, 'do something 
quickly. A sabre-toothed tiger has entered Mother's cave. Do something!' 
U g grunted, picked up his well-gnawed buffalo bone and said, 'Why do 
anything? vVho the hell cares what happens to a sabre-toothed tiger?'. 
[jungle family life [stone age - modern age]] 
In (5) you do not find the syntactical link. However, let us remember 
that language is not merely a syntax, but the triple of syntax, class of mod-
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els and meaning function. Contrasting of the two languages here happens 
on the level of models. The words of the wife belong to the common lan-
guage, but U g denies to interpret it there - he interprets it in the models 
of family life, where the mother-in-law is the most dangerous to him. It 
can be said that he constructs the common language badly. 
However, this case can also be discussed by the help of syntax. In 
many cases the class of models can be described by sentences of the lan-
guage, that is by axioms. 
Let L =< F, M, k > be a language, let Ax be a consistent set of 
formulas, and let M od( Ax) denote those models of M, which satisfy all 
sentences in Ax. Then < F, M od(Ax), k > is a sublanguage of L. IfAxl 
and AX2 define two languages, the common language can be defined by an 
AX3. However, in several cases AX3 cannot be the union ofAxl and AX2. 
That is the case in (5), where an axiom of jungle, like 
(tiger) 
ought to overwrite a snmJlar axiom of family life 
The set of axioms determining the class of models of different lan-
guages is a description of \vhat we call background knowledge. Background 
knmvledge is essential to understand jokes. Let us think for example of the 
"'l-'''\...!'''~ kno'vvledge we have to appreciate (3). 
In the following we give some typical constructions, where the syntac-
ticallink is not important or is missing altogether, and the double meaning 
is created in a semantical way. 
5.1 Double lYlt:u,"lHnq 
To bolster atterldan.ce at the church choir he dH'prt.,,- husband sent 
out this notice: 'Free admissions. :Ne\'! anthems with QU.CH',-'H6 cover designs 
for liberals. anthems 'with familiar cover design for conservatives. Exit-
choir responses. Fun benedictions. Stylish choir -::obes viith two precut 
slits in the back for potential' . 
[advertisement relIgIon [church·transcendenta1l] 
Above the language of advertisement is connected to an ecclesiastic 
matter. To put the words of an improper language to the mouth of a person 
is often source of humour, if the words may remain meaningful. 
Joke (6) merits our attention for some other factors, too. First, the 
elements of the two languages are mixed together unseparably. As to have 
got it one has to go back and forth between the two languages. Secondly, 
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note the sudden change of worlds in the last sentence. The reference to the 
angel's wings brings us from the atmosphere of an ecclesiastic choir to the 
transcendental world, which only widens the gap between the languages. 
The mechanism of improper language is one of the most widely used: 
e.g. in the cases, when animals and things are anthropomorphised. It 
is also the case, when in scientific publications the author uses jokes or 
quotations from literature as mottos. 
5.2 Improper Language by Situation 
After game, the Vllife at her husband and said 
{I had four aces and three 
t.v""n1n on?' 
in the world did you bid no 
'Two jacks, two queens and martinis'. 
[bridge-party] 
is similar to the case discussed before, since a person says some-
he is not supposed to. However, the utterance is not because 
of a predetermined role: a husband having martinis is humorous only m 
the situation described in the joke. 
Let us see the semantical link: 
language of bridge 
'Two jacks, two queens and Jour martinis 
the real 
explanation 
Note, that here the simple word four is the syntactical link. Proof by 
counter-example: a sensible answer, like 'I had only two jacks, two queens 
but the martinis I had had made me bid so' would not be humorous at all. 
A good example for the role of models is that the meaning of word four 
remains the same, but it has to be interpreted in different models. 
6. The Role of Calculus 
One can often meet such jokes, where humour is connected with some kind 
of implicitly presupposed knowledge. The latter can be considered as a set 
of axioms which is the base of the effect of jokes. A non-valid statement is 
not only stated as valid, but it is also used as a basis of further implication. 
Having the jokes, you have to trace back this implication to find the double 
meaning. Of course enjoying a joke this process is unconscious. Note that 
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double meaning exists also in this case, since the meaning of a proposition 
is its truth-value. Let us see an example: 
(8) The prince, travelling through his domains, noticed a man who 
bore a striking resemblance to himself. He beckoned him over and asked: 
'vVas your mother ever employed in my place? 
'No, Sire' the man replied 'But my father was'. 
Here we first have to infer, what the question really is after; and 
similarly to infer the real meaning of the answer. 
However the role of calculi may be more important. 
(9) Any big men born around here?' a tourist asked in a condescend-
ing voice. 'No', responded the native. Best we can do is babies. Different 
in the city, I suppose. 
Here the double meaning at word big is a simple business, but the 
last sentence suggests a strange analogy: 'the bigger the place, the bigger 
the new-born babies are'. So the native has a rule of inference, which is 
quite uncommon. In similar cases it is easier to contrast logics instead of 
contrasting languages. 
Note the more effort has to be spent to trace the conflict in a text, the 
nearer we are to puzzles, moreover this way we get to the famous paradoxes 
of logic. 
1, Conclusions in the Form of !uesti1ol]ts and Answer 
Have Viie defined humour? 
The semantic characterisation alone cannot define humour. As 
I\:OESTLER (1977) writes, the mechanism of the three characteristic human 
abilities - namely humour, art, and creative problem solving, - is the 
same. This means that it cannot be decided on semantic level, \vhether 
an utterance is humorous, has aesthetic value, or is a description of a 
creative step in solving a problem. According to Koestler the emotional 
attitude makes the difference between humour, art, and creative problem 
solving. Fitting it into this paper's terminology. we may say that the 
further characterisation of humour is not a semanticaL but a pragmatical 
question. 
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- Why do we laugh? 
While in the semantics of humour the main idea of this paper seems 
irrefutable, this question cannot be answered by studying languages, logics. 
It is a question of psychology. At any case laughter is a way to resolve 
stress. In the case of verbal humour while passing the text, the subject 
has to change languages (frames of references) unexpectedly. This surely 
may cause some stress. According to Koestler intellect can follow this 
change, but emotion, having greater inertia, cannot. He claims, that this 
lll<:oTigrml;y IS dissolved laughter (KOESTLER (1977) pp.55-54). 
This paper has showed that at a semantic level humour can be charac-
terised perceiving a situation or idea in two self-consistent, but usually 
incompatible languages or frames of reference. Our tools for knowledge rep-
resentation are theoretically able to detect such features. 'Ne used In 
our analysis, but RASI<IN (1979) made similar investigations using scripts 
as representation of semantics, and from the formulation of the feature it 
is clear that frames are proper tools to detect it. However, in spite of the 
theoretical possibility it would be nearly impossible to describe the back-
ground knowledge needed for appercieving any of the jokes quoted here. 
The problem is the same, as in problem solving systems: the practical prob-
lems are too complex. However, if we have really intelligent robots, they' 
will be armed with the ability to handle a complex hierarchy of languages. 
So they have to detect the semantic features of some jokes parsing its text. 
Naturally we do not think of jokes dealing ""vith overcomplicated human 
relations (sex, politics, etc.) However, mathematics has its own humour, 
there are humorous chess puzzles, too. For example we think that a really 
intelligent chess program has to be able to detect a humorous (or beautiful) 
game. 
And finally: 
- can robots laugh? 
According to the above said, understanding humour does not imply the 
ability of laughter. However, the sudden contrast of the incompatible lan-
guages will probably create some kind of 'stress' in the intelligent robots of 
the future, and this stress has to be neutralized somehow. Remember the 
sci-fi stories, where robots or intelligent supercomputers are driven mad 
by paradoxes! It does not seem impossible that robots will have an ability 
with the same function as laughter in human beings. 
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